Religious Studies 40 (4):485-491 (2004)

In a number of earlier papers I have attempted to defend the providential utility of simple foreknowledge as a via media between the accounts of divine providence offered by Molinists, on the one hand, and ‘open theists’, on the other. In the current issue of this journal, Michael Robinson argues that my response to one of the standard difficulties for simple foreknowledge – that its providential employment would generate explanatory loops – is inadequate. In the following paper I answer Robinson's charge.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0034412504007279
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,735
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Behalf of a Mutable Future.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2077-2095.
Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge.David P. Hunt - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (3):394-414.
The Freedom of Christ and Explanatory Priority.Timothy Pawl - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):157-173.
On Chance in Causal Loops.J. Berkovitz - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):1-23.
Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
Leibniz on Providence, Foreknowledge and Freedom.Jack D. Davidson - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst


Added to PP index

Total views
94 ( #110,052 of 2,432,398 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #465,713 of 2,432,398 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes