Reference and Meinongian Objects

Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):23-36 (1981)

Abstract
Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formahzation of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be estabHshed if Parsons' theory is correct. This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps1981142
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Referring to Fictional Characters.Edward N. Zalta - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (2):243–254.
Critical Review of Parsons' Non-Existent Objects. [REVIEW]Kit Fine - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (1):95-142.
Referring to Fictional Characters.Edward N. Zalta - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (2):243-254.

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