Abstract

This volume offers a critical interrogation of the widely influential legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. As the central figure in contemporary Anglo-American legal theory, he has been involved in various debates, in the past mainly with critics on the right, who took issue with his "radical liberalism". In contrast, the authors of this text challenge Dworkin's radical credentials not only with regard to his general political philosophy, but also with reference to his legal theory, his interpretive method and his view of judging. This volume offers a critical interrogation of the widely influential legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. As the central figure in contemporary Anglo-American legal theory, he has been involved in various debates, in the past mainly with critics on the right, who took issue with his "radical liberalism". In contrast, the authors of this text challenge Dworkin's radical credentials not only with regard to his general political philosophy, but also with reference to his legal theory, his interpretive method and his view of judging.