The metaphysics of responsible believing

Manuscrito 41 (4):255-285 (2018)
Abstract
Contemporary philosophy of mind has tended to make the believer disappear. In response, Matt Boyle and Pamela Hieronymi have argued that believing is an act or activity, not a mental state. I argue that this response fails to fully critique contemporary accounts of believing. Such accounts assume that states of believing are particulars; with semantic properties; that we attend to in reflection and act on in inference; and with a rich causal life of their own. Together, these assumptions leave no room for the believer in an account of believing. But these assumptions are not entailed by the idea that believing is a mental state. Careful reflection on other kinds of states helps us see how to put the believer back in the heart of our account of believing.
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.dh
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References found in this work BETA

How Knowledge Works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.
Active Belief.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):119-147.
Agents and Their Actions.Maria Alvarez & John Hyman - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (2):219-245.
Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.

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