Causation and Free Will

This paper looks at the main philosophic positions on free will. It suggests that the arguments for causal determinism being compatible with free will can give rise to invalid use of the term "free will". The term "freewillism" is introduced, and the differences between freewillism, determinism and libertarianism are discussed. As is the mechanism whereby freewillism supports free will. A mapping of the philosophic positions on free will to the types of causation is derived, and the evidence supporting the types of causation considered.
Keywords Causation  Free Will  Determinism  Freewillism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,078
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
92 ( #125,337 of 2,498,792 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #421,542 of 2,498,792 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes