Paul Hurley
Claremont McKenna College
Robert Myers’ interpretation of Davidson’s practical philosophy gets Davidson right in many fundamental respects. He rightly argues that Davidson avoids inconsistencies among internalism, ethical objectivity, and the belief-desire theory by modifying central elements of the Humean belief-desire theory, and that Davidson’s alternative legitimizes the extension of his interpretation and triangulation arguments into the practical sphere. But at a crucial fork in the interpretive road Myers loses his way. Davidson follows Anscombe down a different path, one that takes individual desires to be constituted in part by evaluative judgements.
Keywords Davidson  Anscombe  internalism  inconsistent triad  belief-desire theory  desire
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