Moral Rectitude and Human Advantage: A Proposed Reconciliation in Terms of Intrinsic Value Realization
Dissertation, The University of Utah (
1997)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
My dissertation develops and defends a modernized eudaemonistic approach to moral deliberation. I argue that conceding human advantage to be an objective matter, and defining advantage as that which either contributes to or constitutes our realization of intrinsic value, justifies our accepting this notion as a fundamental moral category. ;Specifically, I examine the role that "advantage" has played in the history of moral philosophy, particularly in the thought of the Stoics, Spinoza, and Kant. Using this analysis as a platform, I argue that situationally relevant consequential considerations and situationally relevant deontological considerations represent genuine, irreducible but noncategorically authoritative "modes" of intrinsic value. I further argue that these modes of value can be integrated within a system of practical deliberation yielding defensible prescriptions regarding what one should or should not do. From there I argue that "living morally" involves living in the manner that will allow us to realize the highest degrees and kinds of intrinsic value possible, over the course of our entire lives, and that, insofar as we each live in such a manner, we pursue our individual advantages