European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):326–368 (2004)

Abstract
Nietzsche’s favourable comments about science and the senses have recently been taken as evidence of naturalism. Others focus on his falsification thesis: our beliefs are falsifying interpretations of reality. Clark argues that Nietzsche eventually rejects this thesis. This article utilizes the multiple ways of being science friendly in Nietzsche’s context by focussing on Mach’s neutral monism. Mach’s positivism is a natural development of neo-Kantian positions Nietzsche was reacting to. Section 15 of Beyond Good and Evil is crucial to Clark’s interpretation. The presented interpretation makes better sense of this passage and shows that Nietzsche can accept both falsification and empiricism.
Keywords Nietzsche  positivism  neo-Kantian  Maudemarie Clark  Ernst Mach  naturalism  empiricism  fictionalism  instrumentalism  Vaihinger
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00213.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Gay Science.Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche - 1974 - New York: Vintage Books.
Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.Maudemarie Clark - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 73 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Nietzsche's Sensualism.Mattia Riccardi - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):219-257.
The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy.Mark Alfano - 2010 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40 (1):29-46.
Nietzsche on Monism About Objects.Justin Remhof - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):469-487.
Defending Nietzsche's Constructivism About Objects.Justin Remhof - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):1132-1158.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,466 ( #1,863 of 2,330,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
146 ( #2,988 of 2,330,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes