Useful argumentation: a critique of the epistemological approach

Informal Logic 25 (3):261-275 (2005)

Authors
Brian Huss
State University of New York at Potsdam
Abstract
The main rationale for adopting the epistemological approach to argumentation seems to take the form of a criticism of the consensus theory. This criticism says that some instances of clearly bad argumentation count as acceptable instances of argumentation on the consensus theory. Supposedly, the epistemological approach does not have this problem. I suggest that the kind of normativity argumentation theorists should be concerned with is the normativity associated with giving real-world advice on how to partake in a critical discussion. I try to show that when we understand the normativity of argumentative standards in this way, the main criticism of the consensus theory falls short, and the epistemological approach does not really have the advantages over the consensus theory that it is purported to have. If I am right, then the main reason offered for adopting the epistemological approach fails, and we should stick with the consensus theory
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.Graham Priest - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):294-295.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Question of Truth.David Botting - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (4):413-434.

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