Dynamic stability and basins of attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney game


Authors
Kevin Zollman
Carnegie Mellon University
Simon Huttegger
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
We study the handicap principle in terms of the Sir Philip Sidney game. The handicap principle asserts that cost is required to allow for honest signalling in the face of conflicts of interest. We show that the significance of the handicap principle can be challenged from two new directions. Firstly, both the costly signalling equilibrium and certain states of no communication are stable under the replicator dynamics ; however, the latter states are more likely in cases where honest signalling should apply. Secondly, we prove the existence and stability of polymorphisms where players mix between being honest and being deceptive and where signalling costs can be very low. Neither the polymorphisms nor the states of no communication are evolutionarily stable, but they turn out to be more important for standard evolutionary dynamics than the costly signalling equilibrium
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Citations of this work BETA

Propositional Content in Signalling Systems.Jonathan Birch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):493-512.
Inclusive Fitness and the Problem of Honest Communication.Justin P. Bruner & Hannah Rubin - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Finding Alternatives to Handicap Theory.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):127-132.

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