Frege and the Fundamental Abstraction

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

According to Charles Travis, Frege’s principle “always to sharply separate the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective” involves a move called “the fundamental abstraction.” I try to explain what this abstraction is and why it is interesting. I then raise a problem for it, and describe what I think is a better way to understand Frege’s principle.

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Jim Hutchinson
Nazarbayev University

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References found in this work

Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
Der Gedanke.Gottlob Frege - 1918 - Beiträge Zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus 2:58-77.
Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism.John MacFarlane - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws.Jim Hutchinson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):410-427.

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