Peter Hutcheson
Texas State University
Husserl’s phenomenology is not an attempt to answer questions about contingent fact and existence. Rather, it is an attempt to specify conceptual truths about phenomena. In particular, it takes no stand on the existence of other minds. Thus, any interpretation of Husserl’s answer to the problem of intersubjectivity as affirming the existence of other minds is mistaken
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_2008_18
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Ideas.Edmund Husserl - 2012 - Routledge.
Husserl's Problem of Intersubjectivity.Peter Hutcheson - 1980 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 11 (2):144-162.

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Husserl and the Coherence of the Other Minds Problem.Chauncey Downes - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (2):253-259.
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Psychology From the Phenomenological Standpoint of Husserl.Jacob Golomb - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (4):451-471.


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