Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games

Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19 (2014)

Kevin Zollman
Carnegie Mellon University
Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine
Simon Huttegger
University of California, Irvine
We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with arbitrarily high probability. In addition, we compare these asymptotic properties to short-run behavior
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9467-y
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References found in this work BETA

Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.

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Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science.Remco Heesen - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):698-716.
Probe and Adjust.Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):195-200.

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