Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games

Erkenntnis 79 (S4):1-19 (2014)
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We study a low-rationality learning dynamics called probe and adjust. Our emphasis is on its properties in games of information transfer such as the Lewis signaling game or the Bala-Goyal network game. These games fall into the class of weakly better reply games, in which, starting from any action profile, there is a weakly better reply path to a strict Nash equilibrium. We prove that probe and adjust will be close to strict Nash equilibria in this class of games with arbitrarily high probability. In addition, we compare these asymptotic properties to short-run behavior



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Author Profiles

Kevin Zollman
Carnegie Mellon University
Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine
Simon Huttegger
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science.Remco Heesen - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):698-716.
Signalling under Uncertainty: Interpretative Alignment without a Common Prior.Thomas Brochhagen - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):471-496.
Probe and Adjust.Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):195-200.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.

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