Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73 (2004)

Authors
Daniel D. Hutto
University of Wollongong
Abstract
  It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of 'embodied practice', I defend a secondpersonal approach in this paper
Keywords Explanation  Folk Psychology  Metaphysics  Prediction  Second Person
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DOI 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00272.x
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References found in this work BETA

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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Mindreading in Infancy.Peter Carruthers - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.

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