In P. Pyllkkänen & P. Pyllkkö (eds.), New Directions in Cognitive Science. Finnish Society for Artificial Intelligence (1995)
AbstractThe emergence of cognitive science as a multi-disciplinary investigation into the nature of mind has historically revolved around the core assumption that the central ‘cognitive’ aspects of mind are computational in character. Although there is some disagreement and philosophical speculation concerning the precise formulation of this ‘core assumption’ it is generally agreed that computationalism in some form lies at the heart of cognitive science as it is currently conceived. Von Eckardt’s recent work on this topic is useful in enabling us to get a sense of the scope of the computational assumption. She makes clear that there are two rather different ways in which we could understand cognitive science’s commitment to computationalism and hence two ways to understand the claim that the ‘mind is a computer’, by appeal to either (1) A mathematical theory of computability or (2) A theory of data-processing or informationprocessing. Importantly, she also argues that although there are many aspects of claim that the ‘mind is a computer’ that can be nicely captured by Boyd’s account of the way scientific metaphors are employed, not to direct attention to the hitherto unnoticed, but to encourage investigation of the unknown. Nonetheless, cognitive scientists are not making the claim that the ‘mind is a computer’ in a metaphorical sense. If Von Eckhardt is correct, when cognitive scientists assume the ‘mind is a computer’ and give a sense to the notion of the computer in the sense of (2) above, they are making a literal claim about the nature of mind (Von Eckardt, 1993, p. 116). And as she points out that if one reads (2) in a theoretically committed way then there is no a priori reason to exclude the organic brain from the list of entities that might fall under the description of being a ‘computer’. Important, we can truly describe it as a data-processing (or information-processing) device. What is useful about Von Eckardt’s general analysis of computationalism’s core assumption is that it provides a clear angle from which to view the flaws of computationalism. This paper defends the claim that if there is an account of information adequate to capture those aspects of mind that we regard as essential to mentality it is one that requires us to surrender the idea that the mind is a computer..
Similar books and articles
Information processing, computation, and cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino - 2011 - Journal of Biological Physics 37 (1):1-38.
Is computationalism trivial?Marcin Miłkowski - 2007 - In Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Susan Stuart (eds.), Computation, Information, Cognition: The Nexus and the Liminal. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
Symbol grounding in computational systems: A paradox of intentions.Vincent C. Müller - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):529-541.
The Resilience of Computationalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):852-861.
The computer model of mind.Ned Block - 1990 - In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
All information processing entails computation, or, if R. A. Fisher had been a cognitive scientist . .Eric Dietrich & Arthur B. Markman - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):637-638.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads