Context as knowledge

Mind and Language 37 (4):543-563 (2022)

Abstract

It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communication.

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Torfinn Huvenes
University of Bergen
Andreas Stokke
Uppsala University

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