Disagreement Without Error

Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154 (2014)
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The idea that there can be cases of faultless disagreement, cases of disagreement in which neither party is making a mistake, is frequently discussed in connection with relativist views in philosophy of language. My goal is to argue that we can make sense of faultless disagreement without being committed to any form of relativism if we recognise that disagreement sometimes involves attitudes other than belief, such as desires or preferences. Furthermore, this way of making sense of faultless disagreement allows us to avoid some of the problems that have been raised in connection with relativist accounts of faultless disagreement.



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Torfinn Huvenes
University of Bergen

Citations of this work

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