Epistemic modals and credal disagreement

Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011 (2015)

Abstract

Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does not have to be a difference in outright beliefs in order for the parties to disagree. I argue that the idea of credal disagreement allows us to make sense of otherwise problematic cases of disagreement involving epistemic modals. I also discuss how these ideas can be extended to cases of correction and retraction

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Author's Profile

Torfinn Huvenes
University of Bergen

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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

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Citations of this work

Modal Disagreements.Justin Khoo - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):511-534.
Relative Truth.Herman Cappelen & Torfinn Huvenes - 2020 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Noncognitivism and the Frege‐Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):184-208.

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