Epistemic modals and credal disagreement

Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011 (2015)
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Abstract
Considerations involving disagreement, as well as related considerations involving correction and retraction, have played an important role in recent debates about epistemic modals. For instance, it has been argued that contextualist views about epistemic modals have problems when it comes to explaining cases of disagreement. In response to these challenges, I explore the idea that the relevant cases of disagreement may involve credal disagreement. In a case of credal disagreement, the parties have different degrees of belief or credences. There does not have to be a difference in outright beliefs in order for the parties to disagree. I argue that the idea of credal disagreement allows us to make sense of otherwise problematic cases of disagreement involving epistemic modals. I also discuss how these ideas can be extended to cases of correction and retraction
Keywords Context-dependence  Contextualism  Disagreement  Epistemic modals
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0334-8
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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