Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181 (2012)

Authors
Torfinn Huvenes
Umeå University
Abstract
Predicates of taste, such as?fun? and?tasty?, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument against contextualism rests on a too simple and narrow conception of disagreement that turns out to be problematic once we consider a wider range of cases. If we reject the assumptions about disagreement that the argument rests on, it no longer poses a threat to contextualism.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2010.550305
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