Utilitas 27 (2):217-239 (2015)

Abstract
Luck egalitarians claim that disadvantage is worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk than when it emerges from a chosen risk. I argue that disadvantage is also worse when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would have declined to take, had he or she been able to do so, than when it emerges from an unchosen risk that the disadvantaged agent would not have declined to take. Such a view is significant because it allows both luck egalitarians and prioritarians to respond to Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey's charge that they fail to accommodate intuitions about the moral relevance of interpersonal boundaries – the so-called separateness of persons objection. I argue that the view is plausible independently of its ability to answer the separateness of persons objection, and is a natural extension of the luck egalitarian concern with the impact of unchosen circumstance.
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820814000363
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References found in this work BETA

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Equality and Priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.

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Citations of this work BETA

Prioritarianism: A Response to Critics.Matthew D. Adler & Nils Holtug - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):101-144.
Prioritarianism: Ex Ante, Ex Post, or Factualist Criterion of Rightness?Nils Holtug - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (2):207-228.
Competing Claims and the Separateness of Persons.Jamie Hardy - 2022 - Philosophical Papers 51 (1):89-113.

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