Oxford University Press (1990)

Peter Hylton
University of Illinois, Chicago
Analytic philosophy has become the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. This book illuminates that tradition through a historical examination of a crucial period in its formation: the rejection of Idealism by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the subsequent development of Russell's thought in the period before the First World War.
Keywords Analysis (Philosophy History  Idealism History
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 1992
Buy this book $22.00 used (65% off)   $54.95 new (13% off)   $55.00 from Amazon (13% off)   Amazon page
Call number B1649.R94.H95 1990
ISBN(s) 019824018X   9780198240181   0198246269
DOI 10.1093/019824018x.001.0001
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,262
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA

A general discussion of the problematic relationship between philosophy and its history; an argument against a common view as articulated by Richard Rorty. By contrast with that view, the aim of this book is neither to refute Russell nor simply to appropriate aspects of his thought. It is,... see more

T. H. Green

A discussion of the neo‐Hegelian metaphysics of T. H. Green. In particular, the author emphasizes Green's criticism of empiricism and of his Hegelian reading of Kant, which is opposed to the Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding.

The Underlying Metaphysics

Deals with the initial phase of the reaction, by Moore and Russell, against Idealism. In opposition to that view, they developed an extreme form of realism, which the author calls ‘Platonic Atomism’. The idea of a ‘proposition’ is fundamental for this view. Truth is undefinable, and facts ... see more

Judgement, Belief, and Knowledge: The Emergence of a Method

Deals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; facts become fundamental, and truth defined. Epistemology becomes a far more central concern ... see more

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1225-1247.
The Interactivist Model.Mark H. Bickhard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (3):547 - 591.

View all 123 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
384 ( #23,344 of 2,455,626 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #50,561 of 2,455,626 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes