Knowledge and evidence

Mind 115 (460):891-916 (2006)
Abstract
theory of knowledge defended in Timothy Williamson's book Knowledge and its Limits is compared here with the theory defended in the author's articles ‘How Knowledge Works ’ and ‘ Knowledge and Self- Knowledge ’. It is argued that there are affinities between these theories, but that the latter has considerably more explanatory power
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl891
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
Some Evidence is False.Alexander Arnold - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.

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Evidence= Knowledge: Williamson's Solution to Skepticism?Stephen Schiffer - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--202.
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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