Précis of philosophy and its epistemic neuroses

Dialogue 43 (3):569-576 (2004)
I outline the main arguments of my book, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Westview, 2000), in which I defend an anti-theoretical approach to traditional problems in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of language, focusing especially on external-world scepticism, the indeterminacy of reference, relativism and first-person authority, contending that these problems arise from embracing philosophical commitments that are not quite contradictory, but which suffer from what I describe as "epistemic neuroses"--an acceptance of methodological commitments that make these problems look like problems at the same time as they render them insoluble. I contend that such epistemic neuroses plague both the analytical and continental traditions in philosophy alike.
Keywords scepticism  relativism  Putnam  Davidson  Wittgenstein  first-person authority  Burge  Lacan  radical theory
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300003103
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