Realism and self-knowledge: A problem for Burge

Philosophical Studies 86 (3):303-325 (1997)
Tyler Burge says that first-person authority can be reconciled with anti-individualism about the intentional by denying part of the "Cartesian conception" of authority, which claims that I am actually authoritative about my intentional attitudes in counterfactual situations. This clause, he says, wrongly conflates the evaluation-conditions for sceptical doubts about the "external" world with the conditions for classifying intentional attitudes in counterfactual situations. This paper argues that the kind of possibility needed to understand external-world scepticism justifies the conflation and that Burge can reject the Cartesian conception only if he rejects either metaphysical realism or anti-individualism.
Keywords Epistemology  Realism  Scepticism  Self-knowledge  Burge, T
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1017954811418
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