Future Contingents and Aristotle’s Fantasy

Critica 39 (117):45-60 (2007)

Authors
Andrea Iacona
Università di Torino
Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows how the rejection of bivalence leads to implausible consequences if excluded middle is accepted. In the second place, it addresses the question of why one should reject bivalence, and finds no satisfactory answer. /// Este artículo trata el problema de los futuros contingentes, y se enfoca en dos principios lógicos clásicos: el tercero excluido y la bivalencia. Se podría pensar que una solución del problema requiere actitudes diferentes hacia estos dos principios. Según una hipótesis que parece ampliamente compartida, el tercero excluido debe ser aceptado, mientras que la bivalencia debe ser rechazada. Este artículo argumenta en contra de esta línea de pensamiento. En primer lugar, se aborda cómo el rechazo de la bivalencia lleva a consecuencias poco plausibles si el tercero excluido es aceptado. En segundo lugar, se enfrenta la cuestión de por qué se debería rechazar la bivalencia, sin encontrar una respuesta satisfactoria.
Keywords future contingents  bivalence  excluded middle  indeterminacy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Future Contingents and Relative Truth.John MacFarlane - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Distinctions Without a Difference.Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):203-251.
Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths.John MacFarlane - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 81--102.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Fatalism and Future Contingents.Giacomo Andreoletti - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):1-14.
O Fatalismo Relativístico.Elton Martins Marques - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):231-247.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On the Principle of Excluded Middle.Jairo José da Silva - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (2):333.
Excluded Middle and Bivalence.TimothyJ Day - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.
Knowing Future Contingents.Ezio Di Nucci - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):43-50.
Vagueness: A Variant Approach.Nicholas Rescher - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (4):282-294.
The Necessity of Tomorrow's Sea Battle.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):160-176.
Open Future and Modal Anti-Realism.Daniel Kodaj - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-22.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total views
85 ( #106,077 of 2,309,542 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #44,898 of 2,309,542 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature