Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467 (2021)

Authors
Andrea Iacona
Università di Torino
Abstract
This paper addresses the question whether future contingents are knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer, and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility. Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive answer: future contingents are knowable, although our epistemic access of them is limited in some important respects.
Keywords Future contingents  Factivity  Ockhamism  Knowledge  Bivalence  Open future  Excluded middle  Branching time  Divergence  Lewis  Belief
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Reprint years 2022
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-021-01666-5
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Citations of this work BETA

Credible Futures.Andrea Iacona & Samuele Iaquinto - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):10953-10968.

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