Mind (forthcoming)

Andrea Iacona
Università di Torino
This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As it will be argued, once some basic features of our naıve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of validity outlined here, which displays one coherent way to articulate the Stoic intuition, accords with standard formal treatments of deductive validity and encompasses an independently grounded characterization of inductive validity
Keywords validity  conditionals  Chrysippus  Evidential conditional  support  inference  reasons  argument
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge University Press.
The Development of Logic.William Kneale & Martha Kneale - 1962 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

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Citations of this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

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