Fanciful Examples

Metaphilosophy 48 (3):325-344 (2017)
Abstract
This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of described cases; they identify no special problem with fanciful examples.
Keywords described cases  wide reflective equilibrium  moral intuitions  moral reasoning  thought experiments
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12234
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References found in this work BETA
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Kant Immanuel - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.

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