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Ways to Be Worse Off
Res Philosophica 93 (4):921-949 (2016)
Abstract
Does disability make a person worse off? I argue that the best answer is yes AND no, because we can be worse off in two conceptually distinct ways. Disabilities usually make us worse off in one way (typified by facing hassles) but not in the other (typified by facing loneliness). Acknowledging two conceptually distinct ways to be worse off has fundamental implications for philosophical theories of well-being. (This paper won the APA’s Routledge, Taylor & Francis Prize in 2017.)Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
2168-9105
DOI
10.11612/resphil.1470
My notes
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Citations of this work
Well-being, Opportunity, and Selecting for Disability.Andrew Schroeder - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (1).
References found in this work
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Susan J. Armstrong & Richard George Botzler.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1863 - Cleveland: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Geraint Williams.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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