Contradictions, Disagreement and Normative Error

In Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), New Frontiers in Truth. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 103-114 (2014)

Samuele Iaquinto
University of Turin
My aim is to discuss some counterexamples to the following principle: (P) Necessarily, for every proposition p, for every cognitive agent S and for every cognitive agent S*, if S believes that p and S* believes that ¬p, then either S makes a normative error or S* makes a normative error. If we assume the identity between S and S*, then (P) regulates what I'm going to call psychological contradiction; conversely, if we assume the non-identity between S and S*, then (P) regulates cases of disagreement. In trying to offer counterexamples, I will compare two different approaches: a three-valued approach and a relativist approach. I will argue that adopting the latter is preferable, since, contrary to the former, in offering counterexamples to (P) it does not commit us to hold the controversial metaphysical views that I will present in section 2. Furthermore, it allows us to propose genuine counterexamples not only in cases of syntactic disagreement, but also in cases of semantic and ontological disagreement.
Keywords Disagreement  Vagueness  Philosophy of Language
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