Appropriating Kuhn’s Philosophical Legacy. Three Attempts: Logical Empiricism, Structuralism, and Neokantianism

Cadernos de Filosofia Das Ciencias 8:65 - 102 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori.

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2010-05-16

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Thomas Mormann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München (PhD)

Citations of this work

Carnap, Kuhn, and the History of Science: A Reply to Thomas Uebel.J. C. Pinto de Oliveira - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):215-223.
Carnap, Kuhn, and the History of Science: A Reply to Thomas Uebel.J. C. Pinto de Oliveira - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):215-223.

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