Representaciones 1 (1):1 - 20 (2005)

Thomas Mormann
University of the Basque Country
In this paper we argue that philosophy of science is in need of a comprehensive and deep theory of scientific representation. We contend that such a theory has to take into account the conceptual evolution of the notion of representation in the empirical science and mathematics.In particular, it is pointed out that the category-theoretical notion of an adjoint situation may be useful to shed new light on the intricate relation between the empirical and the theoretical by showing that scientific representations do not mirror reality but are to be conceived as devices for establishing scenarios for a variety of possible representational interventions and interpretations.
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