Basic Knowledge and Contextualist “E = K”

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):282-292 (2013)

Authors
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Abstract
Timothy Williamson (2000) makes a strong prima facie case for the identification of a subject's total evidence with the subject's total knowledge (E = K). However, as Brian Weatherson (Ms) has observed, there are intuitively problematic consequences of E = K. In this article, I'll offer a contextualist implementation of E = K that provides the resources to respond to Weatherson's argument; the result will be a novel approach to knowledge and evidence that is suggestive of an unexplored contextualist approach to basic knowledge
Keywords Brian Weatherson  contextualism  evidence  inductive knowledge  Timothy Williamson  knowledge  epistemology
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.100
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.
Lewis on Iterated Knowledge.Bernhard Salow - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1571-1590.

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