Experimentalist pressure against traditional methodology

Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):743 - 765 (2012)
Abstract
According to some critics, traditional armchair philosophical methodology relies in an illicit way on intuitions. But the particular structure of the critique is not often carefully articulated?a significant omission, since some of the critics? arguments for skepticism about philosophy threaten to generalize to skepticism in general. More recently, some experimentalist critics have attempted to articulate a critique that is especially tailored to affect traditional methods, without generalizing too widely. Such critiques are more reasonable, and more worthy of serious consideration, than are blunter critiques that generalize far too widely. I argue that a careful (empirical!) examination of extant philosophical practices shows that traditional philosophical methods can meet these more reasonable challenges
Keywords intuitions  experimental philosophy  Jonathan Weinberg
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2011.625118
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References found in this work BETA
Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.

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Citations of this work BETA
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Recent Attempts to Defend the Philosophical Method of Cases and the Linguistic Turn.Avner Baz - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):105-130.
Knowledge Is Not Enough.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):658-672.

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