In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press (2018)

Authors
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Abstract
How radical is the idea that reasons are factive? Some philosophers consider it a dramatic departure from orthodoxy, with surprising implications about the bearing of the external world on what credences it’s reasonable to have, what beliefs are epistemically appropriate, and what actions are rational. I deny these implications. In the cases where external matters imply differences in factive states, there will inevitably be important weaker factive states in common. For example, someone who knows it is raining has many factive states in common with someone who has a Gettiered belief that it is raining, or one who falsely but justifiably believes that it is raining. The factive reasons denied to subjects in Gettier cases or skeptical scenarios are in an important sense redundant; appropriate belief or action supervenes on internal states, even if reasons must be factive (and even if appropriate belief and action supervenes on reasons). The degree to which the strategy is applicable depends substantively on epistemic assumptions about basic or foundational knowledge. I argue that even given a significantly externalist approach to the latter internalist intuitions about rational credence, belief, and action can be vindicated.
Keywords knowledge  action  practical reason  reasons  externalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Reasons for Action: Internal Vs. External.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Practical Reasons and Internalism.Hans Vilhelm Hansen - 1990 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
Basic Factive Perceptual Reasons.Ian Schnee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1103-1118.
Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons.Dustin Locke - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52:215-232.
Can Virtuous Actions Be Both Habitual and Rational?Bill Pollard - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):411-425.
Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
Reasons for Action.David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.) - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
The Reasons That Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
Reasonology and False Beliefs.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.
Moral Obligation and Everyday Advice.Bob Brecher - 2005 - South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):109-120.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-05

Total views
476 ( #19,350 of 2,507,721 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #34,394 of 2,507,721 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes