In Lisa M. Osbeck & Barbara S. Held (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge university Press. pp. 192-210 (2016)

Authors
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Abstract
This chapter will consider three themes relating to the significance of intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In §1, I’ll review and explore the relationship between philosophical use of words like ‘intuitively’ and any kinds of mental states that might be called ‘intuitions’. In §2, I’ll consider the widely-discussed analogy between intuitive experience and perceptual experience, drawing out some interesting similarities and differences. Finally, in §3, I’ll introduce the recent movement of ‘experimental philosophy’, and consider to what extent its projects are tied up with questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy. My primary aim will be to survey and explain; I will make no effort, however, to hide the fact that I’m a philosopher and a partisan to some of these debates. So there will be some arguments for controversial points of view, too—hopefully these will be easily perceptible, and my opponents fairly represented. Limitations of space demand a rather superficial treatment of most of our topics; endnotes will direct the reader to more comprehensive discussions.
Keywords intution  epistemology of philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256.
Intuitions in the Face of Diversity.James Andow - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Nottingham
The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.
How Philosophers Use Intuition and 'Intuition'.John Bengson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):555-576.
Disagreements in Moral Intution as Defeaters.Andreas Mogensen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):282-302.
The Faculty of Intuition.Steven D. Hales - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Evidence and Intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):99-107.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-10-12

Total views
1,119 ( #2,849 of 2,326,775 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
67 ( #8,247 of 2,326,775 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes