Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343 (2012)

Authors
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Benjamin Jarvis
Brown University
Abstract
We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
Keywords Pragmatic Encroachment  Belief  Desire  Epistemic Normativity
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DOI 10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00564.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.
Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.

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