Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology
Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343 (2012)
| Authors |
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Benjamin Jarvis
Brown University
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| Abstract |
We develop a novel challenge to pragmatic encroachment. The significance of belief-desire psychology requires treating questions about what to believe as importantly prior to questions about what to do; pragmatic encroachment undermines that priority, and therefore undermines the significance of belief-desire psychology. This, we argue, is a higher cost than has been recognized by epistemologists considering embracing pragmatic encroachment.
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| DOI | 10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00564.x |
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Citations of this work BETA
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.
Interest-Relative Invariantism.Brian James Weatherson - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge.
Belief Without Credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.
Requirements of Intention in Light of Belief.Carlos Núñez - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
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