Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246 (2009)

Authors
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Abstract
What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson's account, according to which we apprehend thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fiction. On our view, intuitions like the Gettier intuition are necessarily true and knowable a priori. Our view, like Williamson's, avoids naturalistic skepticism
Keywords Thought experiments  Philosophical methodology  Intuitions  Gettier cases  Timothy Williamson  A priori knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden’s Tale.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):1-29.
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.

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