Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction

Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246 (2009)
Abstract
What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson's account, according to which we apprehend thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fiction. On our view, intuitions like the Gettier intuition are necessarily true and knowable a priori. Our view, like Williamson's, avoids naturalistic skepticism
Keywords Thought experiments  Philosophical methodology  Intuitions  Gettier cases  Timothy Williamson  A priori knowledge
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9184-y
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden's Tale.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):1-29.
The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.
Awareness of Abstract Objects.Elijah Chudnoff - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):706-726.
Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):465-476.

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