The Rules of Thought

Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia
Abstract
Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
Keywords Thought and thinking Philosophy  Knowledge, Theory of  Philosophy of mind
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Reprint years 2016
Call number B105.T54.I25 2013
ISBN(s) 9780199661800
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Chapters BETA
Fregean Sense First

This chapter concerns deductive reasoning. It is of note that subjects are not generally rationally permitted to jointly accept propositions that are logically inconsistent. This fact illustrates the rational significance of the logical relations that hold between propositions. This chapte... see more

Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology

This chapter develops a moderate modal rationalism. According to this moderate modal rationalism, knowledge of metaphysical possibility and necessity is available through sensitivity to the rational entailment relations between propositions. The imagination can be used to explore these rat... see more

The Nature of Intuitions

The view of the first two parts of the book offers a rationalist epistemology of the a priori that does not afford a central role to intuitions; Part III considers competing rationalist views that do afford intuitions a central role. This preliminary chapter considers some recent denials o... see more

Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology

This chapter situates the previous treatment of the epistemology of philosophy with respect to recent critiques of armchair philosophical methods deriving from the experimental philosophy movement. The best interpretation of the experimentalist critique, it is argued, is one according to w... see more

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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - In Lisa M. Osbeck & Barbara S. Held (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge university Press. pp. 192-210.

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