The Rules of Thought
Oxford University Press (2013)
| Authors | |
| Abstract |
Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
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| Keywords | Thought and thinking Philosophy Knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2016 |
| Call number | B105.T54.I25 2013 |
| ISBN(s) | 9780199661800 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck.Benjamin Jarvis - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):529-551.
Belief Without Credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.
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2013-09-18
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41 ( #147,665 of 2,261,320 )
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8 ( #46,262 of 2,261,320 )
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