The Rules of Thought

Oxford University Press (2013)
Abstract
Ichikawa and Jarvis offer a new rationalist theory of mental content and defend a traditional epistemology of philosophy. They argue that philosophical inquiry is continuous with non-philosophical inquiry, and can be genuinely a priori, and that intuitions do not play an important role in mental content or the a priori.
Keywords Thought and thinking Philosophy  Knowledge, Theory of  Philosophy of mind
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Reprint years 2016
Call number B105.T54.I25 2013
ISBN(s) 9780199661800
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References found in this work BETA
What Else Justification Could Be.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10 - 31.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck.Benjamin Jarvis - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):529-551.

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