Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques

In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256 (2014)
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Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently suggested that the role of intuitions in the epistemology of armchair philosophy has been exaggerated. This suggestion is rehearsed and endorsed. What bearing does the rejection of the centrality of intuition in armchair philosophy have on experimentalist critiques of the latter? I distinguish two very different kinds of experimentalist critique: one critique requires the centrality of intuition; the other does not.

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Jonathan Ichikawa
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Reflective Equilibrium.Yuri Cath - 2016 - In H. Cappelen, T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-230.
The intuition deniers.Jennifer Nado - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.

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