Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):383-394 (2012)

Authors
Daniel Immerman
University of Notre Dame (PhD)
Abstract
This paper compares two proposed solutions to the liar paradox, both of which involve revisions to classical semantics. The first, that of truth value gaps, denies that all sentences are true or false. The second, that of truth value gluts, asserts that some sentences are true and false. A natural question about these proposals is, ?Do they offer equally good (or bad) solutions, or is one better than the other?? Parsons 1990 suggested an answer to this question, arguing that for every problem for one solution, there is a parallel problem for the other. Since then, several people have given arguments for and against the idea that the two face parallel problems. This paper advances the debate in two ways. First, it answers four attempts by Graham Priest to reject the parallel. In particular, it discusses alleged advantages for the gap solution with regard to the teleological account of truth, an extended liar paradox, Berry's paradox, and inexpressibility. Second, it discusses where, if anywhere, the parallel may be broken
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2011.590993
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References found in this work BETA

Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 13 (4):541-544.
True Contradictions.Terence Parsons - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):335 - 353.
Gaps and Gluts: Reply to Parsons.Graham Priest - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):57 - 66.

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