Episteme (forthcoming)

Authors
Daniel Immerman
University of Notre Dame (PhD)
Abstract
The threshold problem is the task of adequately answering the question: “Where does the threshold lie between knowledge and lack thereof?” I start this paper by articulating two conditions for solving it. The first is that the threshold be neither too high nor too low; the second is that the threshold accommodate the significance of knowledge. In addition to explaining these conditions, I also argue that it is plausible that they can be met. Next, I argue that many popular accounts of knowledge cannot meet them. In particular, I lay out a number of problems that standard accounts of knowledge face in trying to meet these conditions. Finally, near the end of this paper, I argue that there is one sort of account that seems to evade these problems. This sort of account, which is called a cluster account of knowledge, says that knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of truth, belief and a cluster of epistemic properties and also that knowledge doesn’t require having all members of the cluster, but merely some subset.
Keywords threshold problem  significance of knowledge  cluster account of knowledge
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Solution to Knowledge’s Threshold Problem.Michael Hannon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):607-629.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
At the Threshold of Knowledge.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):449-460.
Safety's Swamp: Against The Value of Modal Stability.Georgi Gardiner - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):119-129.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
On Interactive Knowledge with Bounded Communication.Ido Ben-Zvi & Yoram Moses - 2011 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (3-4):323-354.
Commodious Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp & Mona3 Simion - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1487-1502.
Unsafe Assertions.Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen de Ridder - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):1-5.
Bar-on on Self-Knowledge and Expression.Matthew Boyle - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):9-20.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-01-05

Total views
58 ( #158,727 of 2,325,981 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #17,912 of 2,325,981 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes