Philosophical Studies 140 (2):213 - 228 (2008)

Ilhan Inan
Koc University
What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid.
Keywords Kripke  General term  Rigid designator  Natural kind term  Essential predicate
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9138-4
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Reference and Essence.Nathan U. Salmon - 1981 - Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Rigid Application.Michael Devitt - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):139-165.
Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte.Stephen P. Schwartz - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (3):265 - 277.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rigid Designators.Joseph LaPorte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities. [REVIEW]Ilhan Inan - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):217-220.
Semantics Through Reference to the Unknown.Arslan Aran - 2016 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):381-392.

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