Jonas Jervell Indregard
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from § 13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports an underappreciated middle position where intuition requires a pre-conceptual use of the understanding. Such pre-conceptual use of the understanding faces both textual and systematic objections. I show that these objections can be rebutted.
Keywords Kant  Conceptualism  Transcendental Deduction  Intuition  Self-Affection  Synthesis
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/agph-2017-0125
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 1988 - Yale University Press.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):389-394.

View all 77 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception.Nathan Bauer - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):215-237.
Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason.Colin McLear - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):79-110.
Is There a Gap in Kant’s B Deduction?Stefanie Grüne - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):465 - 490.
Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction.Robert Hanna - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):399 - 415.


Added to PP index

Total views
368 ( #21,811 of 2,426,585 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
104 ( #6,168 of 2,426,585 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes