Self-Affection and Pure Intuition in Kant

Abstract
Are the pure intuitions of space and time, for Kant, dependent upon the understanding's activity? This paper defends the recently popular Self-Affection Thesis (SAT): namely, that the pure intuitions require an activity of self-affection—an influence of the understanding on the inner sense. Two systematic objections to this thesis have been raised: The Independence objection claims that SAT undermines the independence of sensibility; the Compatibility objection claims that certain features of space and time are incompatible with being the products of the understanding's activity. I show that the resources to rebut these objections can be found in Kant's account of causal influence.
Keywords affection  causal power  influence  Immanuel Kant  space  time
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1286511
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References found in this work BETA
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism.Henry E. Allison - 2004 - Yale University Press.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space.Lucy Allais - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 383-413.

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