Authors
Stephen Ingram
University of Manchester
Abstract
Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the 'moral fixed points view' developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou's proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive the evidential support that it would need in order to play the dialectical role that Kyriacou has in mind for it. I conclude that the moral fixed points view remains in serious trouble.
Keywords Metaethics  Moral error theory  Moral non-naturalism  Intellectual vice  Moral fixed points
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v13i1.228
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.Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.

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