Truthmakers Without Truth

Metaphysica 7 (2):53–71 (2006)
It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, necessarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I argue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent realists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The assumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, determine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth is independent of minds. This follows only on the further assumption that there exist propositions about every feature of reality independent of minds, which is something the immanent realist can and should deny.
Keywords Metaphysics  Truth  Truthmaking  Necessity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truthmaking: A Cognition-Independent Internal Relation with Heterogeneous Relata.Ingvar Johansson - 2004 - In Johann Christian Marek & Maria Elisabeth Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 154--56.
Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers.Jamin Asay - 2011 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Postscript to Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-making. Acumen Publishing.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
The Legacy of Linguisticism.John Heil - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244.
Truth, Recognition of Truth, and Thoughtless Realism.Arindam Chakrabarti - 2001 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:41-59.
Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism.James O. Young - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
On the Mind Dependence of Truth.Diego Marconi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.
Causal Truthmaking.Robin Stenwall - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (2):211-222.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
On Some Alleged Truthmakers for Negatives.Aaron M. Griffith - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):301-308.


Added to PP index

Total views
117 ( #56,339 of 2,313,330 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #125,942 of 2,313,330 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature