Philosophical Studies 168 (3):583-597 (2014)

Authors
Ross Inman
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
Abstract
Plenitude, roughly, the thesis that for any non-empty region of spacetime there is a material object that is exactly located at that region, is often thought to be part and parcel of the standard Lewisian package in the metaphysics of persistence. While the wedding of plentitude and Lewisian four-dimensionalism is a natural one indeed, there are a hand-full of dissenters who argue against the notion that Lewisian four-dimensionalism has exclusive rights to plentitude. These ‘promiscuous’ three-dimensionalists argue that a temporalized version of plenitude is entirely compatible with a three-dimensional ontology of enduring entities. While few would deny the coherence of such a position, and much work has been done by its proponents to appease critics, there has been surprisingly little by way of exploring the various forms such an ontology might take as well as the potential advantages of one plenitudinous three-dimensional ontology over another. Here I develop a novel form of plenitudinous three-dimensionalism, what John Hawthorne (Metaphysical essays, 2006a, b) has called “Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude,” and argue that if one is inclined to endorse an abundant three-dimensional ontology, one is wise to opt for a plenitude of accidental unities
Keywords Persistence  Plenitude  Three-dimensionalism  Four-dimensionalism  Hylomorphism  Thomas Aquinas  Truthmaking  Temporary Intrinsics
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0144-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Against Conservatism in Metaphysics.Maegan Fairchild & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:45-75.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nominalism and Material Plenitude.Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (1):89-112.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Tensed Mereology.Paul Hovda - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):241-283.
Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.G. Nerlich - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):288 – 290.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
How to Save Aristotle From Modal Collapse.Derek von Barandy - 2013 - Studia Neoaristotelica 10 (1):89-98.
Persistence and Space-Time.Yuri Balashov - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):321-340.
In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism.Kit Fine - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:1-16.
Two-Dimensionalism: A Neo-Fregean Interpretation.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-05-24

Total views
418 ( #19,077 of 2,439,682 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #33,507 of 2,439,682 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes