Why so Serious? Non-serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-temporal Relations

Metaphysica 13 (1):55-63 (2012)
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Abstract

It is a common assumption in the metaphysics of time that a commitment to presentism entails a commitment to serious presentism, the view that objects can exemplify properties or stand in relations only at times at which they exist. As a result, non-serious presentism is widely thought to be beyond the bounds for the card-carrying presentist in response to the problem of cross-temporal relations. In this paper, I challenge this general consensus by examining one common argument in favor of the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism. The argument, I claim, begs the question against non-serious defenders in failing to account for their wider metaontological views concerning non-committal quantification

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Ross Inman
Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.
The Puzzle of Change.Mark Hinchliff - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:119-136.
There are no abstract objects.Cian Dorr - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press.

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