Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling
European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232 (2015)
Abstract
While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in modeling decisions. An approach is defended here whereby such value judgments are legitimate when they promote democratically endorsed epistemological and social aims of research. This framework accounts for why it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in a range of modeling decisions, while addressing concerns that the presence of such values will lead to bias or give scientists disproportionate power in deciding what values ought to be endorsedAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s13194-014-0105-6
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Citations of this work
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References found in this work
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino (ed.) - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues From Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming.Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway - 2010 - Bloomsbury Press.
In defence of the value free ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.