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Abstract
While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in modeling decisions. An approach is defended here whereby such value judgments are legitimate when they promote democratically endorsed epistemological and social aims of research. This framework accounts for why it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in a range of modeling decisions, while addressing concerns that the presence of such values will lead to bias or give scientists disproportionate power in deciding what values ought to be endorsed
Keywords Climate science  Values in science  Objectivity  Aims of science  Underdetermination  Inductive risk
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-014-0105-6
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather E. Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
In Defence of the Value Free Ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification.Soohyun Ahn - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:57-65.
A Taxonomy of Transparency in Science.Kevin C. Elliott - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

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